Go If You Know: Using Actions to Test for Metacognitive Uncertainty by Kenol, Samarah & Shaw, Carmen
TITLE: Go If You Know: Using Actions to Test for Metacognitive Uncertainty 
AUTHORS: Samarah Kenol & Carmen Shaw, Jeanette C. Valleau, Barbara A. Church, J. David 
Smith 
FACULTY SPONSOR: J. David Smith, Professor, Department of Psychology 
INTRODUCTION: Humans can understand their own thoughts. They are aware of what they 
do and do not know. This begs the question of whether nonhuman animals share this ability. The 
existence of such capacities would inform us about the possible evolution of these processes. 
Monkeys seemingly understand when they don’t know because they will escape difficult trials 
(for review, Smith et al., 2012). However, this might be conditioned avoidance rather than true 
uncertainty. Recent research has shown that after a response has been made (but before 
feedback), chimpanzees are more likely to run to catch a potential reward when their answer is 
correct than incorrect (Beran et al., 2015).  This suggests true uncertainty because it cannot be 
explained by avoidance. 
PURPOSE: The purpose of this study is to design a computer task for macaques that captures 
the post-response running for a reward paradigm used with chimpanzees, shedding light on 
whether humans and macaques can show the same unambiguous signs of metacognition.  
METHOD: We built a computerized paradigm used first with humans to determine if they 
expressed clear metacognitive confidence. Pixelated boxes varying across a sparse/dense 
continuum were presented. The participants had to categorize them, and after making their 
response, they could move the cursor to catch a coin and receive a reward if correct or slowly 
move back to the trial start if incorrect. They could also stay stationary to start the next trial more 
quickly if uncertain. A similar task with slight modifications is being run with monkeys.  
RESULTS: Results suggest that humans in this task (like chimpanzees in their task) stay put 
more when they are uncertain and move when confident. We are currently testing macaques to 
determine if they also show this metacognitive restraint, or if they fall short in this ability. 
CONCLUSION: Mounting evidence suggests that at least chimpanzees share abilities that we 
initially thought to be uniquely human (Beran et al., 2015). Our current findings with humans 
show that parallels exist between humans and chimpanzees in their abilities to make confidence 
movements, and our future research will determine if macaques also share this ability.  
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